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AND EPISTEMIC VALUE 
 
 
DUNCAN PRITCHARD 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
ABSTRACT. This paper principally argues for two controversial theses: that understanding, 
unlike knowledge, is distinctively valuable, and that understanding is the proper goal of 
inquiry.   
 
 
1. One of the most central topics in contemporary epistemology concerns the issue of 
epistemic value; in particular, the value of knowledge. Knowledge has been the focus of 
much of our epistemological theorising, and this prompts the question of why. What is it 
about knowledge that prompts us to regard it as distinctively valuable in this way such that it 
is worthy of this scrutiny? It is, I would suggest, incumbent on any epistemological theory 
that it can answer this question, even if the answer that is offered adverts to some error on our 
part. That is, while one validatory answer to the question might proceed by offering an 
explanation of why knowledge is distinctively valuable, an alternative, revisionary, answer to 
the question might proceed by explaining why knowledge isn’t distinctively valuable while 
conjoining this explanation with a further story about why we might have naturally thought it 
to be distinctively valuable. In what follows, we will begin by exploring the prospects for a 
validatory response to the question. We will refer to the task of answering this question, 
whether in a validatory or revisionary manner, as the value problem. 
 
 
2. Before we can turn to this issue, however, we need to get a better grip on what it means to 
say that knowledge is distinctively valuable. It certainly means more, for example, than 
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simply showing that knowledge is generally more valuable than mere true belief, what I have 
elsewhere called the primary value problem.1 After all, suppose that one argued that 
knowledge, unlike mere true belief, entailed that one possessed justification in support of 
one’s belief, and that this property of belief was valuable. One would thus have an 
explanation of why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief, but clearly no 
explanation at all of why knowledge is distinctively valuable, at least given the further thesis 
that there is more to knowledge than mere justified true belief. After all, if this is all there is 
to be said about the value of knowledge, then it prompts the question of why it is knowledge, 
specifically, that we focus upon in our epistemological theorising, rather than just justified 
true belief.2 
One might thus think that what is required is an explanation of why knowledge is 
more valuable than that which falls short of knowledge, what I have elsewhere termed the 
secondary value problem. Even a response of this sort will not obviously suffice to solve the 
value problem, however. In order to see this, suppose that one argued that knowledge is more 
valuable, as a matter of degree, than that which falls short of knowledge. One would thus 
have a response to the secondary value problem. Notice, however, that this account of the 
value of knowledge invites a ‘continuum’ picture of epistemic value, with knowledge simply 
marking one point further up the continuum than that which falls short of knowledge. But this 
picture of epistemic value doesn’t present us with any explanation of why it is this point on 
the continuum that is the focus of our epistemological theorising, rather than, say, a point just 
before or just after the one that knowledge marks. In short, this picture doesn’t explain why 
knowledge is distinctively valuable.  
Elsewhere I have thus argued that what is required of a satisfactory response to the 
value problem is a response that satisfies what I call the tertiary value problem, which is the 
problem of showing that knowledge is more valuable than that which falls short of 
knowledge not just as a matter of degree but as a matter of kind. The idea is that as one 
moves up the continuum of epistemic value something special happens when one reaches the 
point that knowledge marks such that more than just a difference in the degree of value enters 
the picture.3  
 
 
3. I suspect that many would want to resist the rather austere demand laid down by the 
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tertiary value problem, but this is not the place to explore this issue further.4 What ought to be 
uncontentious is that it is at least desirable to answer the value problem in such a way that 
one can meet the tertiary value problem. Indeed, in what follows we will simply assume that 
an adequate response to the secondary value problem is availablei.e., that we have an 
explanation of why knowledge is of more value, as a matter of degree, than that which falls 
short of knowledgeand focus our attentions exclusively on the tertiary value problem. As 
we will see, this issue has important ramifications for the ultimate topic of this paper, which 
is the relationship between knowing-why and understanding. 
 
 
4. There is every reason for thinking that there is no account of the value of knowledge 
available which can satisfy the tertiary value problem. The most promising account in the 
literature is that offered by certain virtue epistemologists which claims that knowledge, 
properly understood along virtue-theoretic lines, falls under a general class of entity which 
has non-instrumentali.e., final value.5 This more general entity is that of achievement.  
 Consider an archerlet’s call him Archietaking aim at a target and hitting that 
target with his arrow. Suppose now that Archie in fact has no archery-relevant skills and 
simply hit the target by luck. Would this success on Archie’s part count as an achievement? 
Surely not, since achievements are clearly the product of skill. Interestingly, however, it does 
not suffice for achievement that one is both relevantly skilful and successful. For consider the 
following Gettier-style case. Arche has all the relevant skills and fires at the target. Moreover, 
he hits the target. Still, the success doesn’t count as a bona fide achievement, and the reason 
for this is that during the flight of the arrow a freak gust of wind blew the arrow off-course, 
and then a second freak gust of wind fortuitously blew the arrow back on course again. The 
moral of cases like this seems to be that achievements result when an agent is successful 
because of their ability.  
 It does seem to be true that achievements are distinctively valuable. Imagine two 
agents, one of whom hits the target because of ability, and the other who hits the target 
through luck, either because he lacks the relevant skills, or else because while he has the 
relevant skills and yet the relationship between his success and his ability is ‘gettierized’ by 
luck intervening in the flight of the arrow to the target. From a practical point of view, it may 
make no difference at all how the success was achieved. Even so, wouldn’t one prefer to be 
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in the situation of the archer who succeeds through ability rather than through luck? More 
generally, wouldn’t we value success that is through abilityi.e., a bona fide 
achievementdifferently to a success that is not through ability? To sharpen our intuitions 
here we can simply stipulate that the instrumental value of the success in this case is kept 
fixed, regardless of whether the success constitutes an achievement or not. Accordingly, if we 
grant that there is a difference in value present, then it will not be a difference in instrumental 
value, but rather a difference in final value. And that seems just right. For whatever 
additional instrumental value an achievement contributes over a corresponding success that 
falls short of an achievement, the fact remains that the fundamental difference in value 
between the two relates to the fact that it is only achievements, and not successes that fall 
short of achievements, which are of final value; that are valuable for their own sake. 
 
 
5. The import of this to the debate regarding the value problem, and the tertiary value 
problem in particular, should be obvious. On the standard virtue-theoretic account of 
knowledge at least, knowledge is to be understood as cognitive success (i.e., true belief) that 
is attained through cognitive ability (i.e., epistemic virtue, broadly conceived). Moreover, 
given Gettier-style cases in epistemology, the right kind of relationship between cognitive 
success and cognitive ability seems to be of the same sort that one finds in achievements 
more generallyi.e., one’s cognitive success must be because of one’s cognitive ability. If 
this account of the structure of knowledge is right, however, then knowledge is just the 
cognitive aspect of the more general phenomenon of achievementi.e., knowledge just is 
cognitive achievement.  
 If this thesis were correct, then it would offer an elegant response to the tertiary value 
problem. Why is knowledge distinctively valuable? Because knowledge, unlike that which 
falls short of knowledge, is a cognitive achievement and so deserving of final value. Thus, 
the difference in value between knowledge and that which falls short of knowledge is not 
merely a matter of degree but of kind, just as demanded by the tertiary value problem. 
 
 
6. Unfortunately, this account of the value of knowledge does not work. The problem does 
not lie with the idea that achievements are finally valuable, though there are issues to be dealt 
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with on this score.6 Rather, the fundamental difficulty with this proposal is with the 
identification of knowledge with cognitive achievement. The reason for this is that there are 
clear-cut cases of knowledge which aren’t cases of cognitive achievement, and clear-cut 
cases of cognitive achievement which aren’t cases of knowledge. We will take these cases in 
turn. 
 Consider again the case of Archie. Suppose that Archie has all the relevant archery 
abilities and that he brings to bear these abilities in effecting the hitting of the target. More 
specifically, Gettier-style luck does not intervene between his ability and his success to 
undermine his achievement. On the account offered above, then, this is an achievement on 
Archie’s part, a success that is because of ability. Suppose now, however, that Archie chose 
his target at random from the range of targets before him, but that, unbeknownst to him, if he 
had chosen any of the other targets on this range then he would have missed because of a 
forcefield hidden in the target that would have deflected the arrow. That is, there is luck in 
play in Archie’s success, in the general sense that this is a success that could very easily have 
been a failure. Note, however, that the luck in play is not of the ‘intervening’ sort that is 
operative in Gettier-style cases, but is instead specifically related to the environment in which 
the success is achieved. What is interesting about ‘environmental’ luck of this sort is that it is 
entirely compatible with bona fide achievements. Archie’s achievement in hitting the target 
because of his ability is in no way diminished because of the presence of this environmental 
luck. This result is significant, since knowledge is incompatible with environmental luck. 
 In order to see this, consider the famous ‘barn façade’ case, an example that, 
structurally, is the epistemic analogue of the archery case just given. Our agentlet’s call 
him ‘Barney’sees a barn in ideal cognitive conditions and on this basis forms the true 
belief that there is a barn in front of him. Moreover, nothing intervenes between Barney’s 
barn-detecting abilities and his cognitive successthere is, for example, no barn façade 
before him which is obscuring from view a genuine barnand so we should say that Barney 
is exhibiting a cognitive achievement in this casei.e., a cognitive success that is because of 
cognitive ability.  
 But all we need now do to create a problem for the ‘knowledge as achievement’ thesis 
is stipulate that Barney is in fact in barn façade county, in which nearly all the barn-shaped 
objects are fakes which are undetectable to the naked eyeand thus that had he looked at any 
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other barn-shaped object in the area then he would have formed a false belief. The presence 
of this environmental luck does not undermine Barney’s cognitive achievement any more 
than it does in the case of Archie that we just looked at. Nevertheless, luck of this sort, such 
that Barney has an unsafe beliefi.e., a belief that could have easily been wrongis 
incompatible with knowledge.7 There is thus sometimes more to knowledge than a mere 
cognitive achievement.8 
 Consider now a second case. Imagine our agentlet’s call her Jennifersteps off the 
train in an unfamiliar town and asks the first person she meets for directions.9 Suppose that 
this informant has first-hand knowledge of the area and straightforwardly communicates this 
to Jennifer. Wouldn’t we say that Jennifer could gain knowledge of the right way to go in this 
way? I think we would. Moreover, if testimonial knowledge cannot be gained in this manner 
then it seems that we know an awful lot less than we might antecedently think we know.  
 What is significant about such cases for our purposes, however, is that we wouldn’t 
treat Jennifer’s cognitive success as being because of her cognitive abilities. If anything, we 
would treat it as being because of her informant’s cognitive abilities (or at least because of 
the combined cognitive abilities of Jennifer-and-her-informant), but certainly not just her 
cognitive abilities. Thus, her cognitive success does not constitute a cognitive achievement 
on her part, even though it is an instance of knowledge. Sometimes, then, there is a lot less to 
knowledge than a cognitive achievement as well.10  
 
 
7. So given that this is the only plausible account available of the distinctive value of 
knowledgei.e., an account which can meet the tertiary value problemthen the failure of 
this account means that there is no validatory response to the value problem available. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that there is no adequate revisionary response available. 
This is the line that I take. Since paradigm cases of knowledge are almost exclusively cases 
of cognitive achievements, it is no surprise that we might think that knowledge is 
distinctively valuable even though it isn’t.  
 I also have a further claim up my sleeve in this respect. Like Jonathan Kvanvig 
(2003), I hold that understanding is distinctively valuable. Unlike Kvanvig, however, I have 
an explanation of why this is the case. In order to sharpen our discussion, let us focus on 
understanding of a specific proposition (rather than, say, a subject area), such asto borrow 
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an example from Brit Brogaard (2007)understanding of why one’s house burned down. 
According to Kvanvig, understanding, unlike knowledge, is entirely compatible with 
epistemic luck, in the sense that there is no difficulty in supposing that an agent might have 
understanding of this fact and yet his belief be unsafe. This claim is, however, false, and 
recognising this has important implications for our understanding of the relationship between 
knowledge-why and understanding. 
 
 
8. A natural explanation of why knowledge is distinctively valuable adverts to the role that 
knowledge plays in inquiry. After all, once could plausibly construe all knowledge as the 
answer to a question, at least if one construes what constitutes the target question in a broad 
fashion.11 At best, such an account of the value of knowledge only seems to be able to supply 
us with an answer to the secondary value problem, since there appears no inherent reason 
why simply in virtue of being the successful product of inquiry knowledge should have 
specifically final value. As we will now see, however, the matter is more complex than it first 
appears. 
 When we talk about the product of inquiry as being knowledge of the answer to a 
question I take it that what we are interested inat least typically at any rateis knowledge 
of why such-and-such is the case. For example, suppose I undertake an inquiry to find out 
why my house burned down. In such a case we might regard the question in play as being 
‘Why did my house burn down?’ and the knowledge that is the result of such a (successful) 
inquiry as being knowledge of the answer to this questionviz., knowledge of why my house 
burned down. The standard way of accounting for knows-why is in terms of propositional 
knowledge. So I know why my house burned down because I know that it burned down 
because of (say) faulty wiring.12 
  One might think that understandingat least of the sort that is our focus hereis 
nothing more than just knowing why. That is, to understand why my house burned down is 
just to know why my house burned down, and to know why my house burned down is just to 
know that it burned down because of (say) faulty wiring.13 If that’s right, and many think so, 
then understanding collapses into propositional knowledge anyway, and thus insofar as 
knowledge is not distinctively valuable, then (pending some further argument at least) 
understanding is not distinctively valuable either. Importantly, however, as I will now argue, 
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understanding does not reduce to propositional knowledge, and thus the way is open to argue 
that there is a fundamental epistemic standing that is distinctively valuable. Moreover, insofar 
as we can construe the product of inquiry as specifically providing us with understanding, 
rather than simply propositional knowledge (or something reducible to propositional 
knowledge, like knowledge-why), then the possibility emerges that inquiry is the route to a 
distinctively valuable epistemic standing.14    
 
 
9. There is a very simple reason why there is more to understanding than mere knowing-why. 
In order to see this, we first need to think a little more about what is involved in 
understanding.  
 To begin with, notice that understanding, like knowledge, is factive. This point might 
not seem initially obvious, and the reason for this is that there are species of understanding 
which are not factive, at least in any straightforward sense. I might be said to understand 
quantum physics, for example, and yet this seems entirely consistent with the possibility that 
I have some false beliefs in this regard (though note that you’d better not have many false 
beliefs, and the false beliefs you have had better not be of facts which are central to the 
subject matter in hand). Remember, however, that the type of understanding that we are 
concerned with is more localised, and concerns a specific proposition. Of this sort of 
understanding there can be no doubt that understanding is factive. In order to illustrate this, 
suppose that I believe that my house has burned down because of an act of vandalism, when 
it was in fact caused by faulty wiring. Do I understand why my house burned down? Clearly 
not.15 
 So far, then, understanding and knowledge have similar properties. Another property 
they share is an incompatibility with Gettier-style epistemic luck. Imagine, for example, that I 
arrive home to see my house burned to the ground and a bunch of people outside my house 
dressed up as fire officers. Suppose I ask one of them what happened, and I am told that the 
reason why my house burned down was that I had faulty wiring. Suppose further, however, 
that the person that I am speaking to is not in fact a fire officer at all. Indeed, of all the people 
outside my house, none of them is a fire officer, the fire brigade having long since left the 
scene. Instead, they are simply a group on their way to a fancy dress party and are merely 
taking the opportunity to pretend to be genuine fire officers. Luckily, however, the entirely 
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invented answer that my informant gives me is true. Can I know why my house burnt down 
on this basis? Clearly not, since, for one thing, I manifestly don’t know that my house burned 
down because of faulty wiring, given the Gettierization involved in my gaining a true belief. 
But do I understand, nonetheless, why my house has burned down? Again, surely not. How 
can one gain an understanding of why one’s house burned down by (unbeknownst to one) 
speaking to someone who knows nothing about what caused the fire? 
 I noted earlier that Kvanvig holds that understanding is compatible with epistemic 
luck, but one might now wonder why this is the case, given that it is so clear that it isn’t 
compatible with Gettier-style epistemic luck. The reason for this is that the relationship 
between understanding and epistemic luck is not straightforward since, while understanding 
isn’t compatible Gettier-style epistemic luck, it is compatible with the sort of environmental 
luck that we discussed earlier. For consider now the following scenario. Suppose I arrive 
home as before to find my house burned down, but that this time the person I get the 
information from regarding the reason why this happened is genuinely a fire officer who 
knows what she is talking about. Suppose, however, that when I arrived back at my house 
there was a group of people outside who all seemed to be fire officers, and that I chose one of 
these people at random to speak to about the cause of the fire. Imagine, though, that nearly all 
of the people outside my house are merely dressed as fire officers on their way to the fancy 
dress party noted earlier, and that I just happened to choose the one genuine fire officer 
among them. Furthermore, had I spoken to one of the fake fire officers then I would have 
been told a false explanation of why my house had burned down, but be none the wiser.  
 The structure of this case should be familiar to us, since it is structurally analogous to 
the barn façade example in that one has a true belief that is lucky in the sense that it is unsafe  
but where the epistemic luck involved is not of the intervening, Gettier-style variety. What is 
interesting about this case, however, is that although one’s knowledge of why one’s house 
burned downmore specifically, one’s knowledge that one’s house burned down because of 
faulty wiringis undermined by the presence of this luck, one’s understanding of why one’s 
house burned down is not undermined. That is, one can gain a genuine understanding of why 
one’s house burned down via the testimony of a genuine fire officer, even if there is 
environmental luck in play. Understanding, then, is compatible with one type of epistemic 
luckviz., environmental epistemic luckwhile being incompatible with another type of 
epistemic luckviz., intervening, Gettier-style luck.16  
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10. So understanding, then, unlike knowledge, is compatible with environmental epistemic 
luck. There is a good reason for this, in that understanding, again unlike knowledge, is in its 
nature a cognitive achievement. The necessary marks of a cognitive achievement are all 
there. One can gain understanding and yet, like cognitive achievements more generally, not 
have knowledge of the target proposition because of the presence of environmental luck. 
Furthermore, just as one can gain knowledge without exhibiting a cognitive achievementas 
in the testimonial case described aboveso one can have knowledge of the target proposition 
and yet lack understanding.  
 In order to see this, just consider the following case. Suppose I gain an understanding 
of why my house has burned down by speaking to a genuine fire officer. Suppose further, 
that I now tell my young son why our house burned down. My son, unlike me, has no idea at 
all how faulty wiring might cause a fire. Nevertheless, he can surely come to know why his 
house burned down by being told the reason from someone who he knows is a reliable 
informant, such as his father. Manifestly, however, he does not understand why his house 
burned down, since understanding in this context clearly would require some conception of 
how the cause is meant to bring about the effect.  
 This is yet another reason why understanding should not be thought to be reducible to 
knowing-why. But it is also another reason for thinking that understanding is a cognitive 
achievement. For it reinforces the idea that understanding essentially consists of cognitive 
successunderstanding is factive, rememberthat is because of cognitive ability. For notice 
that while the child might acquire knowledge of why his house burned down from my 
testimony, understanding requires much more than this, which is a genuine conception of 
how the cause and the effect are related, something which, it turns out, knowledge-why does 
not demand. Moreover, unlike knowledge, understanding, like cognitive achievements more 
generally, is consistent with environmental epistemic luckyou don’t lose your 
understanding, or any other cognitive achievement for that matter, just because of the 
presence of environmental epistemic luck. 
If understanding is a cognitive achievement, then it is thereby of distinctive value. As 
we will now see, this point is important for not only how we think of epistemic value more 
generally, but also for how we think about the value of inquiry. 
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11. I noted earlier that the failure of the ‘knowledge as achievement’ thesis to answer the 
tertiary value problem naturally prompts a revisionary response to the value problem. 
Knowledge is not distinctively valuable after all, but merely seems to be since it is 
paradigmatically distinctively valuable. We are now in a position to enhance this revisionary 
story, for we can further argue that there is an epistemic standing, distinct from knowing but 
closely related to knowing, which is distinctively valuable, and that is understanding. Given 
the close relationship between knowledge and understanding, the fact that understanding is 
distinctively valuable can help to explain why we might naturally think that knowledge is 
distinctively valuable, even though closer inspection of this claim reveals that this is false.  
Moreover, I think we can also cast light on why inquiry might be thought to be 
particularly relevant to the problem of epistemic value. As we have seen, if we regard the 
product of successful inquiry as simply knowledge, then it isn’t clear how inquiry can 
contribute to this debate. Given the contrast between understanding and knowledge that has 
just been defended, however, the possibility opens up of arguing that the product of 
successful inquiry is not knowledge at all, but rather understanding. Indeed, I think that such 
a thesis has a great deal of intuitive force. 
 In order to see this, recall the case just described of my son coming to know why his 
house burned down while failing to understand why his house burned down. If the product of 
inquiry is just knowledge, then we ought to regard my son’s coming to know why his house 
burned down as the product of a successful inquiry. Clearly, however, we would not regard 
this as the conclusion of a successful inquiry at all. Indeed, the inquiry has stopped too soon. 
I think this point often gets obscured by the simple fact that when one thinks of 
paradigm cases of successful inquiry one imagines an agent who has both knowledge and 
understanding. By focussing on cases in which only the former is possessed, however, we can 
come to see that the inquiry in question has not been completed successfully. 
Another potential reason why this point might be overlooked could be because of the 
existence of collaborative inquiries in with the result of the inquiry is not fully understood by 
all parties to the inquiry because of the different fields of expertise involved. Such inquiries 
might be thought to constitute a direct refutation of the thesis that understanding is the 
product of a successful inquiry. In fact, there is no tension between collaborative inquires and 
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this thesis. After all, it is surely essential in such cases that at least some of the parties fully 
understand the result of the inquiry if that inquiry is to be deemed successful. For example, 
imagine an inquiry undertaken by a Nobel Prize winner and her lab assistant which results in 
an important scientific result. For this inquiry to be successful it is vital that 
someonepresumably, in this case, the Nobel Prize winning scientistunderstands this 
thesis, even if some parties to the inquiry do not understand it. The product of a successful 
inquiry, even a collaborative one, is thus still understanding, it is just that in some cases the 
understanding is not possessed by all parties to that inquiry.   
 
 
12. I submit, then, that the right way to think about successful inquiry is as specifically 
aiming at understanding and that, since understanding is distinctively valuable, this has 
important implications for the debate regarding epistemic value.17 
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NOTES 
 
1  The use of the word ‘generally’ here is important, since it ought not to be a constraint on an adequate answer 
to the value problem that it show that knowledge is always more valuable than the comparable epistemic 
standing, in this case true belief. In Pritchard (2007e) I refer to this as the modest reading of the value problem, 
and offer a fuller defence of this reading. Henceforth, I shall take the modest reading of the value problem as 
given. 
2  Of course, one might at this juncture opt to take a revisionary line on the value of knowledge, rather than a 
validatory line, and claim that what is really of distinctive value is just justified true belief, an epistemic 
standing that could easily be confused with knowledge given that Gettier-style cases are relatively uncommon. 
This is just the sort of line taken by Kaplan (1985).  
3  For further discussion of the primary, secondary and tertiary value problems, see Pritchard (2007c; 2007e). 
4  I defend this formulation of the value problem further in Pritchard (2007c; 2007e). 
5  This proposal finds its most explicit expression in the work of Greco (2002; 2007; forthcominga; 
forthcomingb), though the original source for this idea is earlier work by Sosa. For Sosa’s most recent statement 
on this issue, see Sosa (2007, ch. 4). Interestingly, the claim is usually that knowledge, qua achievement, is 
intrinsically valuable, but this thesis rests on a confusion between final and intrinsic value. For more discussion 
of this point, see Pritchard (2007c; 2007e). 
6  I discuss these issues further in Pritchard (2007e). In order to simplify matters, in what follows I will take it as 
given that achievements are finally valuable. 
7  For more on safety, see Sosa (2000) and Pritchard (2002; 2005, ch. 6; 2007a; 2007b). 
8  Greco (2007; forthcominga; forthcomingb) offers a response to objections of this sort. For further discussion 
of this response, see Pritchard (forthcominga; cf. Pritchard 2007d; 2007e). 
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9  This example is adapted from one offered by Lackey (2007). 
10  Notice that the claim being made here is only that Jennifer’s cognitive success does not constitute a cognitive 
achievement. In particular, the claim is not that it is of no credit at all to Jennifer that she has a true belief, which 
is the conclusion drawn by Lackey (2007).  
11  See Schaffer (2005) for an excellent defence of this thesis.  
12  The locus classicus for the reductionist view is Hintikka (1975). See Schaffer (forthcoming) for a 
modification of the reductionist position, albeit one that is very much in the spirit of standard reductionist views. 
13  Consider the following remark made by Lipton (2004, 30) and quoted in Grimm (2006, 1), for example: 
“Understanding is not some sort of super-knowledge, but simply more knowledge: knowledge of causes”. The 
natural way to read this passage is as suggesting that understanding why one’s house burned down is just 
knowing why it burned downi.e., knowing that it burned down because of (say) faulty wiring.  
14  It is worth noting the order of explanation here. Whereas one might argue that knowledge is valuable because 
it is the product of inquiry, the thought in play here would rather be that inquiry is valuable because it results in 
something distinctively valuablei.e., understanding. 
15  I further defend the claim that understanding is factive in Pritchard (forthcominga). See also Kvanvig (2003) 
and Grimm (2006). For a defence of the non-factive conception of understanding (bearing in mind that different 
things are sometimes meant by this term), see Zagzebski (1996), Riggs (forthcoming) and Elgin (forthcoming). 
16  By failing to recognise this distinction between environmental and intervening epistemic luck, Grimm (2006) 
ends up arguing that understanding is entirely incompatible with epistemic luck, and thus that it is simply a 
species of knowledge.  
17  I am grateful to Franck Lihoreau for inviting me to write this paper. An early version of this material was 
presented at the University of Edinburgh in 2007, and I am grateful to the audience for their feedback. Work on 
this topic was completed while in receipt of an AHRC research leave award. 
